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In July 2008, at the Paris meeting held to launch the Union for the Mediterranean 
(UM), the Syrian President Bashar al-Asad was probably the most important guest. President 
Sarkozy had invited al-Asad not only to attend the meeting on the UM, but to participate the 
celebration for the 14th of July in the French capital. This was the most potent signal to date that 
Syria’s crucial role in the Middle East was reluctantly acknowledged since the marginalisation it 
suffered following the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003. Since then, ‘from a position of almost 
complete rupture and isolation, Syria has become a sought-after player on the international scene’ 
(Zisser, 2009: 108). 
How did Syria manage to move from a position of almost complete isolation to one 
where the country is once again a crucial actor in regional politics? In addition, how did the regime 
ensure its domestic stability despite significant international pressures and economic 
underperformance? The answer to such questions lies in a multi-level understanding of the power 
structures affecting the regional system and on the complexity of Syrian domestic politics. First and 
foremost, Syrian foreign policy of the last few years has been based on the realist principle of 
balancing. Rather than submitting to US ‘unipolarity’, Syria opted for balancing when it felt that its 
national security was under threat. This is most evident if one examines the foreign policy adopted 
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in the aftermath of the US invasion of Iraq. This balancing however needs to be analysed in 
combination with the concept of resistance (muqāwamah), which has become the essence of the 
political discourse of actors opposing the externally-driven political restructuring of the Middle 
East. The adoption of a balancing stance coupled with the renewed legitimacy that ‘leading the 
resistance’ provides allowed the Syrian regime to meet its domestic challenges, which are mainly 
linked to continuous economic underperformance. The over-bloated and inefficient public sector 
and significant demographic growth are largely responsible for the relative backwardness of the 
economy. This has led to a rise in unemployment and poverty together with a slashing of subsidies 
and rising prices for first necessity commodities. All this has yet to be offset by the growth of the 
private sector. As George (2003: 162) pointed out, ‘it is on its economic performance rather than on 
its record on democracy or human rights that the regime is most vulnerable.’ 
                        The US failure in Iraq, the political stalemate in Lebanon following Syrian 
withdrawal and the rise in strength of both Hamas and Hizbollah vindicate to a large extent Syria’s 
foreign policy choices and have put to rest the doubts about the statesmanship of Bashar al-Asad. 
The ability to extricate itself from a very threatening position has allowed Syria to invest its 
political capital and legitimacy on the home front in order to meet the challenge of broadening the 
constituencies supporting the regime. While in the longer term, the co-optation of rising social 
groups may undermine Asad’s rule, for the moment ordinary Syrians have rallied around the flag, 
allowing the leadership the opportunity to widen its room to manoeuvre. A number of factors 
contributed to this. First of all, the sectarian violence in Iraq demonstrated what could happen in the 
Syrian streets if the authoritarian regime were suddenly removed, revealing implicitly the 
preference for an enlightened authoritarianism over the uncertainty of change. Secondly, the regime 
gave room to Islamic charities to provide social welfare in urban settings, indirectly accepting the 
rise of Islamist social movements (Pierret and Selvik 2009). Finally, the regime has proved the 
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resilience of Arab identity in a moment of confrontation with the West. This has had the unintended 
consequence of silencing the opposition group with the strongest potential for mobilization against 
the regime: the Muslim Brotherhood (Talhamy 2009). This is because Asad, unlike most of the 
other Middle East rulers, cannot be outflanked in foreign policy matters by radical Islamists. The 
paradox of the shifts in state-society relations is however that purely political opposition is being 
brutally repressed precisely because of the new found strength of the regime. Furthermore, the 
ability to meet some of the most significant domestic challenges has then been used, in a feedback 
loop, to further expand the room to manoeuvre abroad. Thus, it is only through the linkage of 
external and internal dynamics that one can explain the undeniable success Syria had in 
withstanding the external and domestic challenges it faced when Bashar al-Asad took (Hinnebusch, 
2005; Perthes, 2004). In fact it could be argued that contrary to the expectations of many both 
within and outside Syria, Bashar has, through his foreign policies, put to rest the questioning of his 
legitimate succession to his father. The four books under review analyse the role of Syria in global 
and regional politics, providing an interesting variety of perspectives on Syrian foreign policy, 
based on conflicting theoretical assumptions. 
Rubin’s work is the most controversial due its normative posturing, representing a 
body of scholarship that deals with Syria as a redoubtable enemy for the US and Israel. Rubin’s 
central thesis is based on the ‘domestic insecurity hypothesis’ (Jouejati, 2009: 186). In short, this 
hypothesis postulates that the guiding principle of Syrian foreign policy is regime survival. It is 
from this hypothesis that Rubin derives all other conclusions about Syrian engagement with the 
international community. Rubin describes the Syrian regime as unstable, minority-led, lacking in 
popular legitimacy and dictatorial and therefore in need of engagement in external conflicts to 
distract domestic attention from its sectarian Alawite character and to justify its repressive rule. 
From this depiction of the regime, it follows that foreign policy is not about seeking conflict 
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resolution; the regime’s real objective is to maintain a significant degree of regional instability so 
that it can continue to maintain its grip on power in the name of national security. Rubin is quite 
correct in arguing that Syria is not an accommodating actor, but this is because the terms of 
accommodation offered by external actors contradict Syria’s vital security interests and its identity, 
not because of the authoritarian and sectarian nature of the regime. Rubin’s understanding of Syrian 
foreign policy leads him to claim that Syrian participation in the negotiations with Israel under 
Turkish mediation are only half-hearted and should not be understood as a meaningful process to 
recover its occupied territory. Engagement in a never-ending peace process allows Damascus to 
prevent external intervention and it permits simultaneously to cause troubles throughout the region 
in order to be perceived as indispensible for their resolution. This argument that authoritarian states 
use their foreign policy in order to counter their lack of domestic legitimacy and constitute a threat 
for neighbouring democratic states suffers however from a number of problems. From an empirical 
point of view it is questionable whether authoritarian states are more aggressive than democratic 
ones (Rosato, 2003). Secondly, Rubin fails to consider the presence of other actors in the regional 
system and he conceives of Syrian foreign policy in a vacuum, which then makes Damascus always 
pro-active and capable of strongly influencing regional politics. This is a misleading representation 
of the reality. While it might be true that Damascus acts at times as a spoiler, we should take into 
account that Syria operates under severe regional and global constraints given the presence of 
powerful actors in its own front- and backyard. This means that Syria’s foreign policy is often 
reactive (Jouejati, 2009). Specifically, Rubin’s claim that regional conflicts are the product of 
‘Syria’s mischief’ is dubious. After all, it is improbable that the Iraq quagmire the US finds itself in 
is only caused by foreign fighters and weapons transiting through Syria. A similar argument can be 
made regarding the instability in Lebanon. One should not forget that successive Israeli invasions of 
the country profoundly altered Lebanese power structures and sectarian relations. When it comes to 
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the issue of the Golan Heights and the peace discussions with Israel, it is also dubious to claim that 
the Syrians are only interested in prolonging the negotiations ad infinitum in order to secure regime 
survival. An in-depth examination of Israeli-Syrian relations on this point convincingly highlights 
how Israel has been more often responsible for the failure of securing an agreement (Slater, 2002). 
Finally, Rubin’s analysis rests on questionable assumptions about Syrian domestic structures. 
Reducing domestic politics to the sectarian dichotomy of an Alawite minority pitted against a Sunni 
majority fails to capture the complexity of current socio-political and regime structures. This 
interpretation had already come under criticism in the past (Perthes, 1990) and the portrayal of the 
two groups as cohesive makes even less sense today with trends towards homogenization of 
political identities (Sadowski, 2002) under the consolidation of Syria’s state institutions 
(Hinnebusch, 2005). More importantly, Rubin’s argument is based on the idea that the Syrian 
leadership has free rein in conducting foreign policy, but this overlooks the divisions within the 
foreign-policy making apparatus and that were for instance evident on the issue of the withdrawal 
from Lebanon. 
Zisser’s study equally deals with Syrian domestic and foreign policy under Bashar al-
Asad. Zisser’s volume is neatly divided into two sections. The first and much more convincing one 
focuses on the domestic level, while the more problematic second part analyses the ‘blunders’ of 
Bashar al-Asad whom he labels an ‘inexperienced amateur in conducting foreign policy’ (p. 126). 
Zisser provides a nuanced study of Bashar’s first years of ‘commanding Syria.’ Embedded in a 
narrative of succession and transfer of rule from father to son, Zisser offers an in-depth 
characterization of Syria’s political system. His analysis of its power structures, reasons for 
enduring stability and the accurate description of dynamics surrounding the transfer of rule allow 
readers to clearly grasp the nature and scale of the domestic challenges facing Bashar al-Asad upon 
coming to power. Zisser’s arguments are particularly convincing because they avoid simplistic 
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assumptions about the domestic political game. However when Zisser moves to analyse Syrian 
foreign policy, he is on shakier ground. The main problems with his analysis of foreign policy 
derive from over-emphasising the figure of Bashar al-Asad. This leads to a number of assumptions 
that fail to capture the complexities of Syrian foreign policy-making and, more importantly, the 
complexity of the regional system where other powerful actors operate, constraining Syria’s 
behaviour. In some ways, Zisser makes a similar mistake to Rubin by excluding from the analysis 
the actions and decisions of all other actors, including the other Arab states, in the regional game, 
preventing therefore a dynamic explanation for how Syria responds. The over-emphasis on 
leadership begins with the assertion that Hafiz al-Asad had left such an imprint on the country that 
‘an argument can be made for the near total identification of the Syrian state with its leader.’ There 
might be a degree of truth to this, but the following logical step that Zisser takes is more 
problematic. In his study, Bashar al-Asad is depicted as widely inexperienced and lacking the 
support of crucial constituencies within the regime; he is unable to fill his father’s shoes and this 
leads him to commit serious errors. Zisser focuses in particular on the poor relationship with the 
US, which led to the international isolation of the country and, more importantly, to the loss of 
Lebanon. The explanation of Syrian foreign policy decisions over the last decade as a series of 
errors is not very convincing if one looks at how Syria has actually re-entered the game as an 
indispensible regional actor. For instance, the breakdown of the relationship with the U.S. that his 
father had carefully managed since the end of the Cold War can hardly be solely Bashar’s fault. In 
fact, immediately following 9/11, the degree of cooperation in the ‘war on terror’ between the U.S. 
and Syria was substantial, highlighting how acutely aware the Syrian leadership was of the 
importance of the relationship with the U.S. It is with the invasion of Iraq that the wedge between 
the two countries became wider and there was little that Bashar could do to stop the Bush 
administration, if not warning Washington of the regional chaos that would ensue. Once American 
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troops were in Iraq and noises were made in the U.S. that Syria would and should be next in line, 
Syria decided that the best strategy to adopt was to take a number of balancing actions directed at 
countering U.S. influence in the region, including discreet support for the Iraqi resistance. The U.S. 
adventure in Iraq added to the already existing and diverging interests between the two countries, 
including the peace-process with Israel, which had come to a shuddering halt following the second 
Intifada. Balancing also took place at a wider regional level and while Syria was indeed forced out 
of Lebanon, it used its Lebanese allies to make sure that its most significant interests there would be 
protected. In addition, the departure of the Syrian powerbroker from Lebanon seemed to clearly 
destabilise the country, brining sectarian politics again to the fore. The subsequent developments, 
such as the ability of Hizbollah to hold on to its guns and the election of a president Syria can live 
with, demonstrate this quite clearly. Ultimately therefore, the supposed blunders that Bashar made 
and that forced Syria out of Lebanon have resulted in quite a positive outcome for Syria. In 
conclusion, Zisser offers a very interesting comparison between Hafez and Bashar in dealing with 
foreign policy challenges. He ‘praises’ Hafez for his ability to conduct a foreign policy that 
achieved a degree of success given the regional constraints, but fails to bestow the son with the 
same abilities. In this, his argument has been proven partially wrong because, under more severe 
constraints and facing the much more direct challenge of invasion, Bashar has done equally well in 
protecting fundamental Syria interests. 
 A further demonstration of its balancing tactics when the country was under threat and 
isolated by the George W. Bush administration can be found in Syria’s attempt to ‘re-discover 
Europe.’ As Hinnebusch (2003: 1) stated, ‘a major alteration in Syria’s policy under Bashar was the 
strategic priority given to relations with Europe.’ There seem to be two fundamental reasons that 
can explain the search for a partnership with the European Union. Domestically, the Syrian ruling 
elites believed that the underperforming economy could benefit from the administrative overhaul 
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and the aid that Europe guarantees to its partners. In addition, liberalisation of trade could have 
brought much needed foreign investment. Internationally, a closer partnership with the European 
Union, embodied in the Association Agreement (AA), would have signalled to regional rivals that 
the Syrian regime was not isolated and retained legitimacy and significance. The relationship 
between Syria and the European Union is dealt in detail with in the book by Dostal and Zorob. 
Zorob’s contribution is highly descriptive, but it brings to light two very significant points. First of 
all, it emerges quite clearly that the content of the Agreement deviated from the EU norm. 
Agreements with other MENA countries did not contain the same extensive economic, political and 
security provisions. This meant that Syria had to make many more concessions in the negotiation 
process with the European Union, including a very problematic clause on non-proliferation, which 
in the regional context amounted to a virtual recognition of its inability to withstand Israeli 
superiority. The second important point we can infer from Zorob’s analysis is that Syria comes 
across as a rather weak actor in need of finding powerful actors to cooperate with to cope with the 
pressure of the US and Israel. Accordingly, Damascus was willing to tolerate significant internal 
costs by pushing through far-reaching neo-liberal reforms and compromise on issues of national 
security. When the AA was frozen by the EU following the falling-out between France and Syria 
over Lebanon because of the Hariri assassination, it was the Syrians who were most disturbed by 
this decision because they had invested a significant political capital in the negotiations. Over the 
course of the negotiation process and after the initialization of the agreement, the European Union 
put a number of stumbling blocks in the path of signature and ratification by citing diverse issues 
such as human rights, proliferation and lack of cooperation to overcome the political stalemate in 
Lebanon and to disarm Hizbollah. Dostal’s contribution focuses more on the potential costs for 
Syria of entering into a ‘neo-liberal’ Association Agreement with the EU. Using the theoretical 
tools of dependency theory, Dostal quite convincingly argues that many of the provisions of the AA 
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would be detrimental to the Syrian economy if they were to come in effect. What is interesting 
about Dostal’s analysis is that it coincides with criticism of the Agreement in certain sectors of 
Syrian society because, as he argues, ‘many sections of the society are likely to see a deterioration 
in their social status as a breach of an implicit contract between their social interests and state 
agency’ (6). As mentioned above, despite such high internal costs, Syria was not only willing to 
sign, but was pushing for early ratification. Paradoxically, the European game of attempting to 
extract even more advantages has now backfired. The success of the balancing actions of Syria 
combined with its perceived uncompromising stance on the front of ‘resistance’ in the aftermath of 
the Gaza war in 2008-2009 began to reaffirm Syria’s indispensible role in the region, leading the 
international community to recognize Damascus as a privileged interlocutor for regional stability. 
Given this, Damascus no longer needs to go along with an Agreement which might result in paying 
high internal costs. Thus, in order to avoid domestic criticism and discontent for signing a 
potentially damaging neo-liberal document, Syria has now unilaterally and indefinitely postponed 
the signature of the AA. What is interesting in the relations between the EU and Syria is that it 
demonstrates the validity of the ‘balancing argument.’ When Syria needed the EU as a potential 
mediator with the United States and an external ‘legitimizer’ it was willing to bear significant 
internal costs to have a privileged partnership with the EU, but as soon as the need to forcefully 
balance receded, it refused to undermine its domestic stability by accepting what amounts to undue 
interference in its own internal affairs. 
All the issues discussed above are brought together in what is the most enlightening 
volume on Syria of the last few years: Fred Lawsons’s Demystifying Syria. In this edited volume, all 
the contributors are intent on challenging a number of myths that surround mainstream and 
normative interpretations of Syria. The contributors tackle both domestic politics and foreign policy 
from different disciplinary perspectives, providing innovative explanations and insightful analyses 
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of a changing Syria under Bashar al-Asad. When it comes to the international role of Syria there is 
very little doubt that Salloukh’s chapter is not only very informative, but analytically sound and 
much more in line with the reality on the ground than Rubin’s and Zisser contributions. Through the 
theoretical prism of realism, Salloukh clearly explains the balancing strategy of Syria and offers a 
very convincing account of how Damascus managed to survive the very real crisis it faced in the 
aftermath of the invasion of Iraq to become once again a decisive and powerful actor on the 
regional scene. Rather than relying on facile assumptions about the domestic insecurity paradigm 
and on the miscalculation thesis so central in Zisser’s argument, Salloukh privileges a systemic 
explanation. The missing link that can be found in Salloukh’s argument is that he does not deal very 
much with what we termed the feedback loop and the regime-legitimizing concept of ‘resistance’, 
but this does not undermine the validity of his argument because there is no doubt that the balancing 
stance of Syria is crucial to understand the regime’s current success. A similar argument can be 
made regarding Lawson’s contribution on the neglected topic of Turkish-Syrian relations. Through 
a very thick description of the relations between the two countries since the late 1990s, Lawson 
amply demonstrates how new patterns of behaviour can be detected in Syrian foreign policy, which 
is therefore not the static and ossified actor that Rubin would want us to believe. This is for example 
demonstrated in Bashar’s decision to renounce the territorial claim that Syria had over the province 
of Hatay (Iskanderun). We can infer from Lawson’s work that a better relation with Turkey serves 
the balancing requirements of Syria. In addition, having Turkey as a mediator with Israel signals 
that Syria is now putting its trust in a country with which it almost went to war a decade ago to act 
as an honest broker with its main regional rival. The contributions on domestic politics are equally 
impressive, particularly the ones by Pierret, Ismail and Ababsa. The latter in particular shows the 
interlacements of regional and local dynamics through the exploration of Iranian influences at Shi’a 
shrines in Syria. The main strength of this edited volume is that it is not ‘normatively obsessed’ 
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with the Syrian regime and analyses both domestic and international changes by treating the country 
and its leadership as rational actors attempting to satisfy their preferences with the capabilities at 
their disposal. This enterprise therefore contributes to a much clearer understanding not only of 
Syrian foreign policy, but also of the regional dynamics that have affected the MENA since the 
beginning of the new millennium. 
The ability of Syria to not only survive, but to a certain extent to thrive in a very 
challenging environment requires an explanation that goes beyond what much of the literature on 
Syrian foreign policy, with its normative obsession, has offered so far. It is no longer sufficient to 
describe and interpret Syria’s external relations through the simplistic lenses of the dictatorial and 
‘evil’ nature of the regime or through the personality of its president Bashar al-Asad. While 
normative judgments should be passed on the nature of the regime in Damascus, the realist notion 
that domestic politics does not necessarily explain external behaviour seems to hold true in the case 
of Syria and regional politics overall. Far from being the amateurish leader that Zisser describes, 
Bashar al-Asad has proven the resilience of Syria without having enormous resources at his disposal 
and without betraying the value and significance of resistance to outside interference. The concept 
of resistance is very relevant when one analyses Syrian foreign policy and merits closer attention. 
Rubin (167-168) attempts to deconstruct the concept, highlighting that ‘”resistance” is to battle 
against something, not to have any positive program of one’s own. The word gives away the secret; 
it is a reactionary effort to maintain an undesirable status quo.’ This characterization serves to 
demean the concept and underscore its pliability to realpolitik interests. However, such an 
understanding of resistance is quite problematic as is the interpretation that Rubin gives of its 
consequences in foreign policy-making. There is no doubt that Syrian foreign policy is militant and 
the concept of resistance is embedded in it. This is the result of Syria’s self-perception of its 
political role in the region, which allows a portrayal of Bashar by the regime as the ‘beacon of 
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resistance’, ‘the beating heart of Arabism’, and guardian and defender of the Arab cause which has 
a strong and persistent appeal for Syrians and the wider Arab public. Such portrayal is not only 
instrumental, but contains a powerful discursive identification. It follows that today’s Syria does not 
actually seek to maintain the regional status quo as Rubin argues. On the contrary, Syria is 
attempting to break the strategic dominance of Israel and the United States. Defiance of the global 
(US) and regional (Israel) hegemon via asymmetric balancing occurs through a set of alliances with 
both state and non-state actors that are bound together by common interests, but also by a common 
discourse of resistance to anti-imperialism and Western penetration. Obviously different actors such 
as Hamas, Hizbullah and Iran construct and select a specific form of the discourse of resistance 
suited to their interests and position, but this does not mean that they do not share a common core 
that binds them in their anti-status quo stances. In the specific case of Syria, resistance is not simply 
‘empty words’ to feed the domestic public, but it is, when circumstances allow it, a very concrete 
practice. Thus, when the Gaza war occurred, Syria did not take any military action against Israel 
because of the power imbalance between the two countries, but in the name of Arab solidarity Syria 
did welcome over a million Iraqi refugees and hundreds of thousands of Lebanese during the Harb 
Tammuz of 2006. These are very tangible deeds that strengthen the credibility of the Syrian 
leadership and can be re-invested as political capital in foreign policy-making. In many ways 
therefore ‘the identification of Syrian interests with the Arab cause is no mere fiction and a purely 
Syria-centred policy never took form: had it done so, Syria could long ago have reached a Sadat-
like settlement over the Golan. ... Syria’s interests coincided more than those of other Arab states 
with wider Pan-Arab norms, and without pan-Arab solidarity those goals could not be achieved. 
Syria’s definition of its “national interest” and role conception could be best characterised as Syro-
centric Arabism’ (Hinnebusch & Etheshami, 1997: 60). These identity dynamics should not be 
considered irrelevant relics of the past and should be taken into account when explaining Syrian 
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foreign policy. As Salloukh (p. 172) concludes, ‘foreign policy based on classical balancing, 
asymmetric balancing and balking has enabled Syria to resist to its geopolitical interests and protect 
the security of the regime.’ Together with the concept of resistance to western penetration, this 
explains Syria’s choice of alliances, partnerships and policy courses much more than accounts 
based on notions of ideology related to the creation of a Greater Syria, of sectarianism built around 
the vague concept of a ‘Shi’a Crescent’ and of the miscalculations of its president. 
 
Given the widely diverging theoretical frameworks applied in the volumes under 
review to explain and assess Syrian foreign policy, it is not surprising to find profound differences 
over policy implications. For Rubin, the only author to directly address policy suggestions, the best 
means to tackle the problems that Syria is creating in the region is a mixture of isolation and 
pressure. Rubin argues that Syria has no legitimate grievances in foreign policy and the ones it has 
are simply a smokescreen to allow the regime to survive. Accordingly, Syria behaves in a disruptive 
manner to pre-empt the conclusion of peace process negotiations with Israel because it would force 
Damascus to deal with its unstable internal situation. The only way to deal with the Syrian regime is 
to isolate it, put under intense pressure and if necessary resort to covert operations to show up its 
weaknesses until it decides to accept the imposition of an externally-constructed security and 
political order. Zisser differs quite substantially from Rubin’s position and he seems to implicitly 
accept the legitimacy of some of the Syrian grievances, particularly the ones linked to the conflict 
with Israel. In this respect, Zisser seems to suggest that a policy mix of containment and careful 
engagement with Damascus to solve the problem of the Golan Heights should be attempted 
provided that a less poisonous regional climate comes into being. Zorob implicitly advocates a 
policy of critical engagement when it comes to EU-Syrian relations. The Association Agreement, 
despite the shortcoming and the potential economic and social costs that Dostal points to, 
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constitutes an excellent instrument with which the international community can begin to engage 
with Syria and, over the long-term, moderate its foreign policy stances. Lawson’s edited book has 
the specific intention of demystifying Syria by criticising current assumptions about the country 
and, by implication, the policies in place to deal with Damascus. 
The days when Syria was threatened by military intervention are gone and it seems 
that all Western actors see the possibility of engaging Syria at a different level. This necessarily 
means recognising both the legitimate grievances and the interests Syria has in the region. Through 
its foreign policy positions Syria represents a powerful player in the Arab world that is opposed to 
Western penetration and interference in the region and to the double standards that the international 
community seems to have when dealing with regional actors. Whether this resistance stance has 
concrete foundations is to a certain extent irrelevant because the perception of Western imperialism 
and Israeli expansionism does exist and needs to be addressed. This does not mean giving in to 
Syrian blackmail if it occurs, but it requires the acknowledgment that Syria should be dealt with as a 
rational actor whose identity is deeply embedded in the discourse and practice of resisting the 
encroachment of security, political, social and economic structures it perceives as menacing. 
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